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ROUGHLY A CENTURY has passed since
Stanley Jevons wrote a tract on the value of
gold in which he incidentally discussed "vari-
ations of permanent investment" as they re-
lated to "great commercial fluctuations."
Roughly half a century has passed since
Wesley Mitchell wrote his monumental 1913
volume on business cycles. This, therefore,
might be a time to honor
the cycle concept. Instead a
basic question is being
raised: "What's left of the
business cycle?" What has
happened?
Another concept, one of
steady growth, has entered
the field as a description of




by certain Malthusian res-
ervations—this concept of
steady growth has been widely accepted for
a long time, and increasingly governments
have been taking it as a guide for action. Has
the world perhaps changed so much that
cycles are, or soon will be, of historical in-
terest only?
To answer, one needs to consider under
what conditions the steady advance widely
desired can be achieved. As I see it, steady
over-all economic advance can be achieved
only (1) when there are no important im-
balances—as, for example, between produc-
tion and consumption and some types of pro-
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duction and others; or (2) when the effects
of important imbalances are largely offset-
ting; or (3) when any important net effect is
largely offset by actions of responsible
people in government who understand what
is going on, know of acceptable means for
reshaping events, and can make timely use
of their knowledge. Have conditions affect-
ing private and public
decision-making changed
enough to prevent develop-
ment of imbalances or to
offset their effects?
A related inquiry of spe-
cial technical interest to
economists, econometri-
cians, and statisticians is
whether, if somehow steady
advance were to be achieved
for any considerable period,
there would then be cyclical
evidence for the analysis
that policy-makers might
need to make to prevent the return of cycli-
cal fluctuations. Certainly, reference cycles
for the economy would be gone and specific
cycles for particular industries would be mod-
ified. Also, for a transition period, the choice
of time periods from which to draw general-
izations would be even more critical than
it has been heretofore. But those of us work-
ing in this area are accustomed to dealing
with problems too tough to handle in any
precise or assured fashion. We should cer-
tainly be glad to reconsider the concept of
cycles and to face the problems posed here if
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the economy could be rid of cyclical fluctua-
tions, at not too great a cost in terms of other
goals of the economy. What are the chances?
CHECKERED CAREER OF CYCLE
CONCEPT
Useful as the concept of business cycles
has been to analysts and policy-makers, over
the past half century, it has had a checkered
career. As an alternative to "financial crises"
the new term served more than one purpose.
It emphasized change throughout the busi-
ness community. It also called attention to
several features of broad fluctuations in ac-
tivity characteristic of specialized industrial
economies in which business decisions were
centered on profit making. Cyclical change
was continuous, cumulative, and self-revers-
ing. Although cycles were by no means uni-
form in different times and different places,
perhaps, after all, there was more order to be
found in business fluctuations, at home and
abroad, than had been supposed. Perhaps
study of the cyclical aspects of broad eco-
nomic fluctuations would facilitate "predic-
tion and control," to use the language of that
day.
Ever since 1913, intensive efforts have
been made to develop cyclical analysis in
many different directions, especially at the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Data have been examined and classified in
many different ways; standards for defining
stages of cycles and choosing turning points
have been set; many an average has been
struck to suppress irregularities; the search
for reliable leading series has been continu-
ous; and numerous theories have been for-
mulated to explain common and different
features of various cycles.
But this has been a turbulent half century,
with two world wars, major changes in the
technology and composition of economic ac-
tivity, and important shifts in the loci of eco-
nomic power, within and among nations. In
this country, population has more than
doubled. Meanwhile the number of people
living on farms has declined and now is only
7 per cent of the total rather than 33 per
cent. The Federal Government's share of
gross national product has risen from almost
nothing to 10 per cent, and canons of
respectability for Federal participation in
economic affairs, as revealed in Presidential
messages and Supreme Court decisions, have
altered greatly. Methods of analysis have
changed in basic ways, moreover, reflecting
in part the analytical work of John Maynard
Keynes, the advent of the national income
and product accounts, the coming of elec-
tronic computers and charting machines,
and the development of new statistical tech-
niques.
Altogether, economic facts and fancies
have changed greatly over the years, in ways
not always readily represented by straight
lines. In the depression years of the 1930's,
the cycle concept seemed to have lost much
of its significance. The central problem of the
economy then was how to avoid perpetual
stagnation. The sharp recession of 1937-38,
however, was a reminder of cyclical elements
of change even at low levels of resource
utilization. Now, in the middle 1960's, with
activity not far below full employment
levels, the hypothesis of perpetual uninter-
rupted growth gains a hearing—and con-
siderable support. What's left of the business
cycle? What does the recent record show?
THE RECENT RECORD
From a quick look at Chart 1, we can see
some basis for growing hope that the cycle is
moderating. In the two decades since the
war, the physical volume of industrial pro-
duction in this country—output at factories
and mines and in the electric and gas utility
industries—has fluctuated over a much nar-
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NOTE.—Monthly data, seasonally adjusted.
rower range than in the interwar period. The
latest advance, moreover, has continued for
an unusually long time—nearly 5 years.
The recent record in terms of gross na-
tional product, as revised, is one of steadier
growth than that of industrial production,
which is more heavily weighted with volatile
activities. This steadier growth is evident
in the middle panel of Chart 2, where quar-
terly figures are shown for real GNP and
for industrial production. In the top panel
the more frequently used current dollar ag-
gregates for GNP are shown and in the bot-
tom panel the monthly index of industrial
production.
Unemployment, presenting the same prob-
lems at however aggregate a level produc-
tion may be measured, has been materially
reduced in recent years. For some groups it
has reached low levels, for other groups it is
still so high as to contribute to many serious
economic and social ills. The average for
all groups, after a long period of economic
expansion, is now somewhat below 4.5 per
cent of the civilian labor force, as compared
with 7 per cent in early 1961, a little over
5 per cent in early 1960, and a little over
4 per cent in the middle 1950's.
In most countries of Western Europe, as
is evident in Chart 3, industrial production
has expanded very rapidly most of the time
since 1953 and, except for the recession in
Italy last year, cyclical influences on aggre-
gate production have been evident chiefly in
shifts in the rate of advance; the "stop and
go" phrase often used to describe develop-
ments in the United Kingdom, where growth
has been slow, was designed to cover periods
of hesitation and slight decline rather than
of sharp reversal. It is only within the broad
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NOTE.—Top panel: GNP in current dollars, quarterly at an-
nual rate; middle panel: quarterly; bottom panel: monthly.
GNP data, from Dept. of Commerce. All data seasonally
adjusted.
aggregates of production and employment
and in the record of policy that strong evi-
dences of persistent cyclical influences
appear.
POLICY AND MARKET INFLUENCES
The unprecedented length of the current ex-
pansion in the United States has been par-
ticular cause for recent wonderment and
hope. Have various tax measures designed
to increase aggregate demand by stimulating
investment—and, also, consumption, di-
rectly and indirectly—perhaps been so well
framed and so well timed as to justify belief
in greater wisdom in policy-making and
steadier growth in the economy? Looking
backward, should cyclical developments ear-
lier in the postwar period perhaps be reread
more in terms of policy mistakes—mistakes
that need not be repeated—and less in terms
of the cumulative effects of internal imbal-
ances likely to recur unless market condi-
tions are basically changed? Some analysts
think so.
Some other analysts take note that the
length of expansion periods has varied rather




NOTE.—"Western Europe" includes OECD countries in Eu-
rope, except Switzerland. Data are monthly, seasonally adjusted.
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of imbalance are to be found in the recent as
well as the distant past. They also urge
further consideration of the wisdom or folly
of credit and other policies adopted earlier,
as in the 1950's.
Pursuing the question of imbalances, I am
impelled to inquire first how far relevant
basic economic conditions have changed, say
since 1913.
PRIVATE BUSINESS DECISIONS
To list many changes in composition of out-
put, means of distribution, methods of fi-
nancing, and the like would be instructive;
and one could speculate usefully on their im-
pact on cyclical fluctuations. Certainly one
should make mention of the greatly in-
creased size of Federal expenditures, espe-
cially for defense purposes, and the cor-
responding increase in tax receipts; the new
and expanding social security program; and
insurance of bank deposits and savings and
loan shares.
But the observation I find important to
make first is that independently made busi-
ness decisions to buy or sell—under still
more or less competitive conditions—con-
tinue to play a central role in economic ac-
tivity. The Federal Government is seldom
consulted on the accumulation of inventories
or the acquisition of new plant and equip-
ment, or about the manufacture or purchase
of goods to pass on to consumers. The terms
on which goods are transferred or services
rendered are generally agreed upon by pri-
vate parties, subject to few legal restrictions.
Broad fiscal and credit policies, it is true,
do have some effect on business choices,
and so do broad policies embodied in wage
and price guideposts. Decisions on particular
activities, such as raising cotton, or borrow-
ing to buy securities, or pricing public utility
services are affected in varying degrees by
public agencies. Federal agencies, more-
over, do inquire what businesses have done
or are about to do; and businesses cooperate
in furnishing information in a way that
would have surprised their forebears.
Nevertheless, the observation about the
independence of business decisions still
stands, modified only to a limited degree.
If a manufacturer or distributor thinks
shortages or price advances are in prospect,
he may still act to protect his interest by
increasing his purchases, thereby stimulating
production, inventory accumulation, and
borrowing. His action will often tend to
make others act likewise to protect their
interest; and the sum of all the decisions
taken by particular enterprises—on the
basis of order books that may be quite mis-
leading as to final demand—may set up
a flow, fund, reverse flow sequence not con-
ducive to steady growth in the economy as
a whole.
Similarly, if fixed investment is under con-
sideration the primary concern is the interest
of the private firm, as seen by its managers.
This need not coincide, for this firm or all
firms taken together, with the interest of the
whole economy in orderly growth.
What, now, is the recent record for in-
ventory change and fixed investment, in the
past among the principal elements in cyclical
fluctuations?
INVENTORY CHANGE AND PLANT
AND EQUIPMENT OUTLAYS
Inventory change quarterly since 1953, as
reflected in real GNP figures, is shown in
Chart 4. Many influences, including strikes
and threats of strikes, especially in the steel
industry, have combined to keep the rate
well above or below cycle averages most of
the time, although the record of the current
expansion is difficult to interpret. Inventory
holdings, shown monthly in Chart 5 at book
value, are now at a level sharply advanced
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CHART 4
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NOTE.—Data are from national income accounts, Dept. of
Commerce, seasonally adjusted annual rates.
but still not high in relation to the uncertain
standard of sales—uncertain because of
trend as well as cycle problems.
For various reasons, inventory accumula-
tion is often greater for materials than for
finished products, as is suggested in the low-
est panel of Chart 5; and production of ma-
terials in industry typically has fluctuated
more widely than production of other goods,
as appears in Chart 6. At the recession low
of early 1961, production of materials in
industry was appreciably lower, relative to
the 1957-59 average, than output of final
products; this year it has been higher, partly
because of the steel strike threat. Here again
interpretation involves trend problems—
materials production may be declining rela-
tive to output of final products. But it ap-
pears that inventory fluctuations will still
bear watching. Differential changes in pro-
duction of materials and final products seem
to be persisting.









NOTE.—Data are from Dept. of Commerce, end of month,
seasonally adjusted.
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NOTE.—Data are monthly, seasonally adjusted.
1960 1965
investment? Chart 7 shows that output of and that since then it has risen to a level
business equipment declined cyclically in considerably higher.
1960-61 to a point slightly lower relative Comparison of another set of figures—
to 1957-59 than output of consumer goods quite independently compiled—yields simi-
CHART 7
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: FINAL PRODUCTS




NOTE.—Data are monthly, seasonally adjusted.
1960 1965
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lar results; an index of plant and equipment
expenditures by manufacturers, on a 1957-
59 base, fluctuates over a considerably wider
range from 1953 to date than the corre-
sponding index for shipments of all sorts of
goods by manufacturers. In the current ex-
pansion, the two indexes show similar
changes until early 1963; since then plant
and equipment expenditures by manufac-
turers have risen at a 15 per cent annual
rate, shipments at a 6 per cent rate—after
allowance for price changes. The current
levels of plant and equipment outlays by
manufacturers relative to shipments is higher
than the average level for 1957-59, not so
high as the level reached in 1956.
Recently revised real GNP figures for
business fixed investment show about as
much rise since 1961 as business equipment
output. By the second quarter this year fixed
investment was 10.3 per cent of GNP, well
above the 1961 recession low of 9.0 and
moderately above the 1960 high of 9.7, but
still slightly below the 10.5 reached in early
1957.
Business fixed investment, it may be
noted, has flow and fund aspects in some
ways similar to those of inventory accumula-
tion, in other ways quite different. Additions
to capacity, for example, generally take
longer, and they have much more lasting
effects.
REINFORCING AND OFFSETTING CHANGES -
The observations made so far only begin to
suggest the nature of the problem of bring-
ing about steady growth. Actually, the ef-
fects of imbalances of the sort discussed—
in comparative volumes of output and in ac-
cumulations resulting therefrom—may aug-
ment each other, or they may offset each
other.
As indicated in Chart 4, for the period
since 1953, the year the Korean war ended,
fluctuations in inventory change and busi-
ness fixed investment have often, but not
CHART 8











NOTE.—Data are from Bureau of Labor Statistics, monthly,
seasonally adjusted.
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always, reinforced each other. Residential
construction has taken a rather more in-
dependent course, starting to rise in 1954
before activity generally; starting down early
in 1955; showing no net rise from 1955 to
date; and being lower now than at the begin-
ning of 1964. In the middle 1950's expendi-
tures on autos followed a course quite simi-
lar to that of residential construction; in the
current expansion they have shown much
more sustained strength, moving more like
business fixed investment. Many other types
of expenditures—as for consumer staples
and some services—have followed a steady
moderate upward course, tending to limit
both the upswings and downswings in gen-
eral activity.
The way this has all worked out for em-
ployment at nonagricultural establishments
in recent years is shown in Chart 8. Particu-
lar note may be taken here of the durable-
CHART 9
nondurable split shown for manufacturing.
This distinction—one that Jevons made—
relates to the nature of the fund in the flow-
fund-flow sequence and cuts across the
producer-consumer line; houses owned by
consumers and office buildings owned by
businesses are both stocks of durable goods.
Stocks of such goods are large relative to
annual output, and fluctuations in output of
such goods are often larger proportionately
than for less durable goods.
Keeping in mind the question about basic
changes in the economy and in the nature
of cycles, have recent changes in the com-
position of industrial output—as between
durable and nondurable goods, producer
and consumer goods, materials, and final
products—been such as to reduce appreci-
ably the threat of cyclical imbalances? No.
Perhaps there is more hope for greater
steadiness of growth from the use of com-
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND INDUSTRIAL PRICES
RATIO SCALE 1957-59100
150 —
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NOTE.—Data are Bureau of Labor Statistics wholesale commodity prices, other than farm
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puters and other improved practices that
reduce inventory requirements; but account
must be taken of increased inventory re-
quirements resulting from the proliferation
of sizes and models of some products, not-
ably autos.
If we do not see a basis of steadier growth
in the changing composition of output—we
should think also about the declining im-
portance of agriculture and the increasing
importance of services in this connection—
is there reason to expect that fluctuations in
particular types of production will be re-
duced—perhaps indirectly by government
action? Or that fluctuations in private ac-
tivities will tend more to offset each other?
Or that net fluctuations in private activities
will be offset in the broad aggregates by
government actions? Before discussing any
of these questions, we must look further,
to consider, for example, how prices fluc-
tuate, and how their fluctuations have con-
tributed to cyclical imbalances.
PRICE CHANGES AND CYCLICAL
FLUCTUATIONS
The variety of cyclical price experience has
been great, as evident in Chart 9, showing
industrial commodity prices and industrial
production since 1913. In some periods,
price changes have been highly significant.
In the early 1930's, for example, persistent
general declines in prices of goods and serv-
ices currently produced, and of existing fixed
assets as well, operated along with other
forces to undermine the foundations of long-
term financial commitments entered into in
the 1920's, contributing to heavy losses and
to the drastic curtailment of investment op-
portunities and means of their financing. In
the middle 1950's, price advances for in-
dustrial commodities contributed to an un-
sustainable situation, stimulating as well as
1940 1945 1950
prices and food, monthly, seasonally adjusted.
1955 1960 1965
Federal Reserve Bulletin: November 19651528 FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN • NOVEMBER 1965
reflecting accumulation of inventories and
a sharp rise in business fixed investment.
But in the late 1920's commodity prices
were not rising, and it is evident that im-
portant problems can develop without wide-
spread commodity price advances. The
CHART 10
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NOTE.—Special Federal Reserve groupings of Bureau of
Labor Statistics indexes, monthly.
sharp unsustainable rise in industrial pro-
duction from a mild recession low of late
1927 to the peak of mid-1929—a rise of
a fifth in a year and a half—reflected other
influences, including speculation in the stock
market on the basis of unwarranted hopes
for uninterrupted advance. Also, for periods
of considerable length, growth may be
steady despite rising prices; it has been for
many years now in a number of Western
European countries.
In the 1950's, a ratchet theory of price
movements gained favor. Given the distribu-
tion of market power in the United States, it
was said, with strong labor unions in key
industries, costs and prices would typically
go up in expansion periods and not decline
in recessions. This theory has not been sup-
ported by the record of the early 1960's, as
can be seen from Chart 10. Industrial prices
as a whole eased in 1961 and now after
nearly 5 years of expansion in the economy,
are only a little higher than they were in
mid-1960. Thus during the current upswing,
a potential cumulative price element in ex-
pansion of demand has been missing, or at
least—remembering marked advances in
nonferrous metals and some types of ma-
chinery—not so significant as it might have
been.
Price stability, to the extent that it has
been achieved in this expansion, has re-
flected the influences that stopped the price
rise of the late 1950's—including credit
restraint—and many current influences.
These include the development and intro-
duction of many new products and cost-
saving processes, the substantial growth in
the labor force and plant capacity, strong
competition from producers in other coun-
tries, and increased consideration by some
producers of the long-term advantages of
maintaining markets as against the short-
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term advantages of higher earnings through
higher prices. Average labor costs per unit
of output have been quite stable, as increases
in output per manhour have roughly cor-
responded to increases in wage costs, in line
with the guidepost set up by the Council of
Economic Advisers.
One question now is whether, if resources
come to be more fully utilized, and expecta-
tions of continued marked advance are
strengthened, prices can be expected to re-
main fairly stable and the disturbing influ-
ence of rising prices continue to be largely
avoided. One factor working to hold back
any general rise in prices will be the increas-
ing amount of new equipment coming into
effective use, replacing higher cost old equip-
ment and adding to capacity; plant and
equipment outlays this year are up about
13 per cent from last year and 28 per cent
from the year before. The chief immediate
price impact of further substantial increases
in outlays now reported planned for 1966
will be to further increase demands for
machinery and metals. A later impact will
be a further increase in the speed at which
new cost-saving equipment is installed and
brought into effective use. With utilization
of resources at present rather advanced
rates, the actual course of prices in any
particular period ahead may depend more
than in some other periods on relatively
small changes in the balance between in-
creases in capacity and increases in
demands, and also on changes in expecta-
tions arising from a variety of sources.
Understanding of what is happening can
be facilitated by study of many detailed
situations—markets are often closely inter-
related—and by study of changes in vari-
ous groups of prices, such as those shown in
Chart 10. (This chart, like several of the
others shown here, is adapted from the
Board's current and historical chart books.)
Prices of foodstuffs are subject to special
supply influences—such as cattle and hog
production cycles—and may well be con-
sidered separately. Among other commodi-
ties, materials prices tend to move in ad-
vance of product prices and over a wider
range. Among product prices, those for
producers equipment behave rather differ-
ently from those for consumer goods. Con-
sideration of the reasons for such differences
in each period is naturally important; me-
chanical projection of past average relation-
ships would be subject to the hazards likely
to be encountered in regarding any average
of a number of items as representative of
any particular item, especially where the
items are drawn from different time periods.
Changes in prices and costs are significant
for cyclical analysis not only as they affect
markets for goods directly but as they affect
profits and profit prospects and the avail-
ability of internal funds to finance new proj-
ects. Rapid increases in profits in recovery
and early expansion are often followed by a
leveling off in profits as production and pro-
ductivity increases slow down and as wage
increases continue, with workers' bargaining
power enhanced by higher levels of produc-
tion and employment. In the current ex-
pansion productivity increases have been
unusually well sustained and so have profits
after taxes, aided directly by legislative and
administrative actions to permit faster de-
preciation, to provide tax credits, and—
effective at the beginning of 1964 and at
the beginning of 1965—to lower corporate
income tax rates.
FINANCIAL COUNTERPARTS
Imbalances touched on already—in flows
and accumulations of goods and in prices and
costs—have their counterparts in the finan-
cial world—flows of credit, accumulations
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of debt, and prices for the use of funds, for
various time periods and various purposes.
Symmetry of analysis might call for equal
space for monetary and credit developments
—or more, to take care of policy problems.
Certainly the financial aspects of interna-
tional economic developments have been of
almost continuous, though changing, con-
cern over the whole postwar period; imbal-
ances in this area, however, have not been
primarily of a cyclical nature. Domestic fi-
nancial problems have been greatly affected
by cyclical swings, even though these swings
have been much less marked than those of
the interwar period. To keep abreast of the
changing situation, the Federal Open Mar-
ket Committee meets every 3 weeks, consid-
ering economic developments at home
and abroad and what actions should be
taken to approximate the reserve position
for the commercial banking system deemed
most conducive to maximum sustainable
growth in production and employment and
stability in prices. The enthusiasm with
which economic analysts in private as well
as public positions advocate different poli-
cies attests to their belief in the importance
of credit developments. Clearly, the recent
move to take account of financial develop-
ments in models of economic behavior was
long overdue. But in this paper I have
chosen to emphasize other elements of the
economic situation.
From what has been said about these
other elements, it is true, anyone would be
justified in drawing the inference that I
would not go along with any analysis of
financial developments that attached over-
whelming importance to some one item such
as the money supply, however it is defined.
In the financial area, as elsewhere, there is
a continuing interplay of changes in quanti-
ties and prices; they need to be considered
together.
FISCAL POLICY
In the final chapter of his 1913 volume, en-
titled "Controlling Business Cycles," Wesley
Mitchell mentioned banking reform first but
went on to discuss other measures—such as
improved information on stocks of goods—
as if he expected that banking reform would
not be enough to achieve even the degree of
modification of cycles that he hoped for. An-
other possibility he mentioned was contra-
cyclical buying of equipment by the rail-
roads, as proposed in France and the United
States, or contracyclical government buying
as proposed in the United Kingdom by Sid-
ney and Beatrice Webb.
The increased relative size of the modern
government budget—including large trans-
fer payments as well as purchases of goods
and services—automatically makes fiscal
policy more significant than it used to be.
Moreover, governments now are widely
expected to accept greatly increased respon-
sibility for keeping their economies on a
path of steady and rapid growth. In the
simplest version of modern fiscal policy,
differences between Federal expenditures
and receipts are to be varied in such a way
as to lend whatever encouragement or dis-
couragement may be needed to offset any
shortage or excess of private expenditures
in relation to the amount needed for full
use of resources. To some extent this varia-
tion can be assured far in advance in setting
up unemployment insurance programs and
developing appropriate tax structures.
Current adjustment of expenditures and
receipts to appropriate levels requires adept
analysis of the developing economic situa-
tion and flexible procedures for adjusting
tax and expenditure programs. Even
the measurement of economic activity and
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income as a basis for estimating tax receipts
and expenditures presents difficulties; we
are reminded of this by revisions of current
series to benchmark data and by the per-
sistence of gaps in information needed for
analysis. The problem is seen to be more
complicated when account is taken of differ-
ences in the effects of decreasing receipts
and increasing expenditures—and the differ-
ent effects of altering different taxes or
different expenditures. These complexities,
however, have already been brought under
intensive study, and increasing recognition
that fiscal affairs should be managed partly
with a view to the changing economic situa-
tion represents an important advance that
has already been reflected in various ad-
ministrative and legislative actions.
The variety of options under the head of
fiscal policy—not to mention debt manage-
ment policy—is wide, and at times policy
can be oriented to specific purposes such as
directly stimulating investment in plant and
equipment or consumption expenditures.
The interest of economic planners in
steady rapid growth is by no means the only
interest to be considered in working out tax
and expenditure programs; defense outlays,
it may be noted, account for the greater part
of Federal outlays for goods and services.
Also, problems often arise in making poli-
cies effective at the appropriate time. Be-
fore the potentials of fiscal policy for cyclical
control can be fully realized, speeding up
of the decision-making process seems essen-
tial and so does recognition that at times
restraint rather than stimulation may be
needed. Flexibility has been a key feature
of monetary and credit policy; the Federal
Reserve System is likely to be reminded of
any lags in adjusting policy to changed con-
ditions. Increasingly in recent years, atten-
tion has been directed to the need for flexi-
bility in the mix of fiscal, monetary, and
other economic policies to take account of
changes in the nature of current problems,
domestic and international.
CONTINUING PROBLEMS
From all this discussion one major observa-
tion may be drawn. Despite numerous
changes, many basic features of our private
business industrial economy—relating to the
composition of output and the organization
of production, trade, and finance—are simi-
lar enough to those of the postwar and even
the interwar period, so that private and pub-
lic decision-makers still need to be on guard
against potential imbalances and cyclical
fluctuations.
Some business practices have improved;
the Federal Government is more important
in the economy these days; institutional
changes introduced in the 1930's—such as
unemployment insurance and deposit insur-
ance—are significant as stabilizers; and al-
tered views as to the functions of the Federal
Government and the purposes of fiscal policy
have already begun to play an important role
in reshaping the course of affairs. But many
of these changes occurred before the post-
war period, during at least the first 15 years
of which cycles of moderate amplitude per-
sisted. Hope for continuing the steady ex-
pansion under way since 1961 hinges not
only on private decisions somehow better
adapted to minimizing inventory, equipment,
and other cyclical surges but also on gov-
ernment fiscal and monetary policies that
will be in fact flexible enough so that they
will be changed as may be required to check
the development of major imbalances and,
as far as possible, offset the net effects of
such imbalances as may develop.
Further progress toward steady and rapid
growth seems most likely to be achieved if
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we recognize that decision-makers in private
and public life still have substantial prob-
lems to solve in learning how to appraise
the ever changing economic situation; how
to judge approximately how alternative ac-
tions will affect it—immediately and over
the longer run; and how to reconcile a vari-
ety of objectives, domestic and international.
Not to put forward a counsel of despair or
to minimize the responsibilities that modern
governments should accept, I nevertheless
think a special effort is needed at this time
to keep in perspective the extent of such
progress in learning as has been made so far
and to inquire how we can keep on pushing
back the frontiers of understanding. If cycles
belong to the past, it is because of advances
in understanding now still in the making.
At this uncertain juncture in the history
of cycles, we need to distinguish carefully
in our analyses between two intellectual
worlds—the world of cycles and the world
of steady growth. Estimates must be made
of tax receipts under conditions of full and
expanding employment; the data for making
such estimates must somehow be drawn
largely from a cyclical past. Again, in ap-
praising current developments and policies,
it will not do to argue both (1) that rapid ex-
pansion of one sort or another is to be ex-
pected in a cyclical expansion and so should
be regarded as normal and acceptable and
(2) that full confidence in uninterrupted
expansion will do no damage because we
live in a world of steady growth.
If as economic analysts and statisticians
we are to facilitate progress in transforming
the goals of steady rapid growth and full
employment into descriptions of actual per-
formance—along with the related goals of
price stability and international financial
order—we shall need to keep right on ex-
ploring both worlds. We shall need to keep
right on asking "What's left of the business
cycle?", answering in the best perspectives
of the history of events and ideas that we can
command, and shaping new programs in the
light of what we learn.
NOTE.—This paper has been adapted for the BUL-
LETIN from one presented at the Annual Meeting of
the American Statistical Association in Philadelphia
on September 11, 1965.
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